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INTRODUCTION
Mexico’s energy reform, which in 2013 
opened the hydrocarbon sector to foreign 
investment, has had moments of pain and 
glory.1 December 2016 is a case in point. The 
month started well, with Mexico successfully 
auctioning oil-rich acreage to several 
large and reputable foreign oil companies, 
which are now licensed to explore and 
extract energy resources in the ultra-deep 
waters of the Gulf of Mexico.2 Weeks later, 
however, during the Christmas season, 
Mexicans were hit with a sharp increase 
in gasoline prices.3 At the same time, the 
peso depreciated faster than the dollar, and 
the price of oil rose. Thus, as people were 
traveling during the holidays, driving their 
cars, and spending their Christmas bonuses, 
Mexico’s economy became a financial 
roller coaster, making some angry4 and 
others fearful. Many just shook their heads, 
recalling the government’s promise that 
reforms would guarantee lower prices for 
gas and electricity. Deceit? Chaos? Urgency? 
Lack of transparency in fundamental policy 
decisions? Perhaps all of the above.
REALITY OVERTAKES EXPECTATIONS
The events of December 2016 did not 
come out of the blue. The administration 
of President Enrique Peña foresaw trouble 
back in February 2015 as certain reform-
related events unfolded more quickly than 
anticipated.5 For example, the original 
date for the liberalization of fuel imports, 
January 2017, was moved to April 2016 as 
Pemex strained to satisfy even 40 percent 
of domestic consumption. Three arguments 
were offered to justify the accelerated 
timetable for liberalization: it would attract 
investments for transport and storage 
facilities, promote competition, and thereby 
lower consumer prices. However, such 
developments were unlikely in a post-
reform environment where many complex 
challenges remained. If market dynamics 
and competition, and not state control, are 
to be the main drivers of lower oil prices in 
Mexico, the barriers discussed below must 
be overcome.
 According to a study by the Centro de 
Investigación y Desarrollo A.C. (CIDAC),6 
the first challenge to market competition 
in Mexico’s energy sector stems from the 
ownership of facilities for fuel transportation 
and storage. Before the reform, Pemex 
alone had the legal power to refine, import, 
store, and sell fuel, making it legally 
impossible and economically foolish for 
others to compete. This historic limitation 
of midstream and downstream facilities 
has put newcomers at a disadvantage: it 
is a risk for them to intensively invest in 
new infrastructure while there are still 
many uncertainties about using Pemex’s 
facilities in the interim. For example, as will 
be explained below, it is difficult for foreign 
oil companies to determine the tariffs for 
transport and storage facilities that would 
be payable to Pemex.
 Another obstacle noted by CIDAC, as 
well as many other analysts, is the long 
history of state price controls on fuels. For 
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the real reasons behind the price hikes—
thereby angering consumers who did not 
understand why they were paying more at 
the gas pump. In the Peña administration 
the situation worsened because, to 
encourage support for the energy reform, 
the government made unfounded promises 
of gas, electricity, and fuel price reductions. 
For example, in 2014, then-secretary of the 
treasury Luis Videgaray said that Mexicans 
could bid farewell to “gasolinazos” as one 
of the gifts of the energy reform.11 This only 
deepened the public’s indignation when gas 
prices continued to rise.
CONDITIONS WORSEN
In December 2016, not long after Mexico 
successfully completed its bidding round for 
oil acreage in the Gulf of Mexico, Mexicans 
faced the startling truth about the country’s 
weakening energy security. Contrary to 
Videgaray’s promise about lower prices, 
gasoline was becoming scarce and its 
price was on the verge of an even more 
dramatic increase. Shortly before and during 
Christmas, there were long lines at gas 
stations in 13 Mexican states. Through its 
Twitter feed, Pemex said this shortage was 
mainly due to harsh weather conditions 
in the Port of Tuxpan and fuel theft along 
the Salamanca-Irapuato pipeline. There 
was some truth to that. In 2016, Pemex 
suffered losses of 90,000 liters per day in 
the Minatitlán-Mexico pipeline alone due to 
organized crime. Pemex also explained the 
shortage was a result of maintenance work 
in the Cadereyta refinery and increased 
consumption during the holiday season.
A CHRISTMAS GIFT: LIBERALIZATION
With another gasoline price hike imminent, 
the Energy Secretariat and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) on 
December 21, 2016, announced a series 
of measures that would, in its words, 
“empower consumers” by accelerating the 
introduction of competition, introducing 
price flexibility in some areas, and gradually 
liberalizing prices in other regions. So 
far, Baja California and Sonora are the 
as long as many can remember, people 
have purchased gasoline for less than 
its true value. Inexpensive gasoline was 
perceived as a right because Pemex was 
perceived as a public service. For years, 
subsidized gasoline was also used to keep 
people happy with the government. The 
problem, however, is the socio-economic 
bracket that was kept the happiest: several 
analysts and think tanks have pointed out 
that fuel subsidies have primarily aided 
those prosperous enough to own SUVs and 
other large, gas guzzling vehicles.7
 The CIDAC report also noted challenges 
concerning a closed circle of retail gasoline 
suppliers that is organized in business 
groups operating in specific regions of 
Mexico.8 According to CIDAC, these groups 
do not create competition through service 
station ownership and operation. In fact, 
they may actually create entry barriers 
for foreign oil companies—particularly if 
they have implicit alliances with the state 
or municipal governments that award 
important permits for land and water use as 
well as waste disposal. Another challenge of 
the service station oligopolies, CIDAC notes, 
is they are often concentrated in regions 
where gas stations are spaced far apart and 
drivers have to travel 20 kilometers or more 
to get gasoline.9
THE INEVITABLE GAS PRICE HIKE
These circumstances have existed for 
decades and are not attributable to any 
particular presidential administration. The 
bottom line: there is not enough subsidized 
fuel to satisfy Mexico’s needs. Thus, free 
market forces had to be allowed to operate—
which implied raising the price of gasoline 
to its actual value. Over the course of Felipe 
Calderón’s presidency (2006-2012), gas 
prices gradually crept up, increasing an 
average of 60 percent during his tenure.10 
It was during this time that the term 
“gasolinazo”—slang for fuel price hike—was 
coined. The word’s negative connotations 
included the idea that the increases were 
arbitrary, lacked transparency, and were 
examples of government abuse. A major 
issue was that officials did not explain 
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only states that have floating gas prices. 
The government also implemented an 
intervention program: the Department of 
the Treasury was to determine gasoline 
prices, which meant that the agency 
would continue to manage prices, except 
in liberalized areas, where it nevertheless 
incorporated a considerable tax into the 
price of gas. Further, the government 
announced a 20 percent price increase that 
was to start January 1, 2017; a confusing 
schedule of increases in the weeks that 
followed was soon abandoned.12 However, 
the government put a cap on price 
“flexibility” that no retailer could exceed. 
Also, a special tax for goods and services, 
which had been variable, would be fixed 
in order to increase revenue by 209 billion 
pesos in 2017.
JUSTIFYING THE NEW STATUS QUO
In order to justify the January price hike, 
the Treasury Department said that the 
devaluation of the peso and the increase in 
oil prices had left the government with no 
other option. This argument was unpopular, 
as it seemed fundamentally unfair to raise 
gas prices due to market conditions, when 
consumers never benefited when the price 
of oil was lower. Also, taxes make up a 
large part of the cost of gasoline in Mexico, 
which strongly suggested to many that the 
government was primarily motivated by a 
need to collect more tax revenues in the 
face of dropping oil revenues. So, in effect, 
each gas station in Mexico has become a tax 
collector. Consumers know that. 
CONDITIONS WORSEN FURTHER
For Mexicans, January 2017 brought more 
bad news. Those who had Christmas 
bonuses had spent them on gifts and 
perhaps a short trip, but Mexicans who 
traveled to the United States paid higher 
prices for their vacations and came back 
home to steep inflation, credit cards bills, 
and annual property and car registration 
taxes. New Year’s celebrations in Mexico 
felt like a pressure cooker; some even 
rioted, smashing windows of department 
stores. The winners were those who had 
opposed energy reform. They blamed the 
government for the “gasolinazo.” Many 
argued that the Peña government had finally 
destroyed Pemex to the point that it could 
no longer provide for the people of Mexico.
 Citizens continued to be angry about 
rising gas prices throughout January. The 
mainstream media and Mexicans on social 
media blamed the government. Even NGOs 
that had previously criticized gas subsidies 
said that the higher prices were unjustified. 
Some accused the government of theft and 
corruption. Others lamented the decline of 
Pemex and its conversion to a net importer 
of gasoline, which, they said, endangered 
Mexico’s energy security—particularly in 
light of President Donald Trump’s hostile 
statements about Mexico.13 Thus, concerns 
about Mexico’s inability to provide for its 
own were compounded by worries that 
U.S. exporters would turn their backs on 
their neighbor. A higher level of discussion 
focused on the economic sense of the price 
hike. While it was understandable that 
gasoline could not be as cheap in Mexico 
as in Texas due to the great inefficiencies 
of Mexico’s midstream and downstream 
facilities, the rise in oil prices, and the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso, it was 
recognized that public spending was being 
propped up by gasoline tax revenues rather 
than financed through oil revenues or 
higher taxes for the wealthy. Also, there 
were issues concerning the rationality and 
transparency of public spending. Was the 
government using every peso paid to service 
stations reasonably and in a transparent 
manner? Most doubted that.
BACKPEDALING AGAIN
In February 2017, the government backed 
off from yet another price increase that 
had been planned for the 17th. On February 
22, however, gas prices unexpectedly fell 
by a few cents, depending on the brand 
of gasoline.14 Further, in the hopes that 
liberalization would be an incentive to 
lower gas prices, the CRE announced that 
on March 30, the states of Baja California 
and Sonora would be completely free from 
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in a minimum tariff that was far below the 
commercial rate payable to Pemex for the 
use of its facilities. The results of the auction 
were vital for the participating companies, 
which included major foreign oil companies, 
independent refiners, traders, and retailers. 
Because of the error, these companies have 
had to put their business plans on hold 
until the regulatory authorities are able to 
announce the winners. While the results were 
to be announced by the end of March, the 
outcome of the auction is still unknown. 
CONCLUSION
Today, the price of gasoline in Mexico has 
gone down a few cents and has remained 
stable since December 2016. People have 
gone on with their lives, complaining but still 
buying gasoline. In fact, the country’s first BP 
station opened in Ciudad Satélite, a suburb 
in the northern part of the metropolitan area 
of Mexico City, and the line to fill the tank at 
this station is usually long. It starts at the exit 
ramp of the main freeway and ends at the 
pump. One wonders why this is so, since BP 
charges the same price for the same gasoline 
supplied by Pemex. However, some say that 
the additives BP blends into the gasoline 
make it a better fuel; others may go out of 
sheer curiosity.
 What are the implications of the 
“gasolinazo”? It did not cause inflation, and 
the cost of land transportation systems has 
risen only moderately. The government 
has not, however, pushed to increase 
gasoline choices in urban areas—where 
it would make economic sense given the 
larger population—and it has not designed 
a fairer pricing system for poorer segments 
of the population. Thus, the “gasolinazo” 
may yet affect energy reforms, especially 
because the reform was based on a promise 
that has so far proven false: that fuel 
prices would drop. As noted throughout 
this brief, the opposite has occurred. It is 
unfortunate because Mexicans have a hard 
time accepting that free markets can be 
beneficial since previous privatizations—in 
telecommunications and banking, for 
example—while not unsuccessful, have 
fallen well short of consumer expectations.
state controls. In these northern states, the 
market is now the price setter instead of the 
Department of the Treasury.
 However, liberalization has not reduced 
gas prices in those states. To the contrary, 
service stations have raised prices, partly 
because the cost of imports is higher 
due to inadequate port, distribution, and 
storage infrastructure along the Pacific 
Ocean. Companies who entered the 
market after reforms have also stated that 
regulatory costs (permitting, licensing, and 
authorizations) at the federal, state, and 
municipal level impeded the sale of cheaper 
gas. In addition, contracts with Pemex 
reduced the companies’ profit margins from 
7.5 percent to 6.7 percent. If independent 
service stations were to survive the early 
stages of market reforms, they could not 
afford to lower prices. 
 Of course, price trends are not a secret. 
The CRE created an application called 
GASOAPP,15 which functions like the GPS 
navigation app Waze and tracks prices at 
Mexico’s gas stations. At a glance, one can 
see that there are vast “red” paths of scarce 
and expensive gasoline in Mexico. There are 
several reasons for this that go beyond the 
devalued peso and the high price of oil. First, 
Pemex’s refining facilities are underutilized 
and in critical condition, as are its pipelines 
and storage terminals. However, not one 
publicly available study investigates the 
extent of the damage or offers options to 
repair, reconfigure, and convert refining and 
ancillary facilities. Second, fuel theft has 
gravely affected the market, with thieves 
targeting both pipelines and oil tank trucks, 
and the black market has only grown.16 Each 
cent criminals manage to gain is a loss to 
companies and consumers.
MUDDLING THROUGH
Despite these gaps in analysis and knowledge, 
the government has rushed to implement 
its post-reform plans, albeit with poor 
results. In early March 2017, a snafu occurred 
at the public auction of the pipelines 
and storage terminals owned by Pemex 
Logistics. This auction was suspended due 
a “methodological failure,” which resulted 
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ENDNOTES
1. On December 20, 2013, articles 25, 
27, and 28 of the Mexican Constitution were 
amended so that private and state companies, 
both domestic and foreign, could participate 
throughout the hydrocarbons value chain. 
In August of the same year, the secondary 
legislation was enacted, with nine new laws 
and 12 amended ones. This change eliminated 
the exclusivity of Pemex and the Federal 
Electricity Commission (CFE) in Mexico’s 
energy sector. 
2. For further details of the participants 
and winners of this auction, see http://
www.gob.mx/cnh/articulos/rondas-
mexico?idiom=es.
3. The press release concerning price 
increases and flexibility can be found 
at https://www.gob.mx/shcp/prensa/
comunicado-de-prensa-112-2016.
4. Riots resulted in deaths and arrests, 
especially in the state of Veracruz. See, for 
example, Raúl Cortés, “Las protestas por el 
‘gasolinazo’ en México dejan ya tres muertos y 
más de 600 detenidos,” El Mundo, January 6, 
2017, http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/
2017/01/06/586f6f1fca474181198b459f.html.
5. The original and final calendar for 
gasoline imports, liberalization, and flexibility 
can be viewed at http://www.gob.mx/cre/
articulos/estrategia-de-flexibilizacion-
de-los-mercados-de-gasolinas-y-
diesel?idiom=es.
6. See http://cidac.org/gasolina-en-
mexico-retos-en-competencia-hacia-
libre-mercado.
7. In addition to CIDAC, the Instituto 
Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO) has 
been highly critical of gasoline subsidies. To 
read about the myths of gasoline subsidies, 
see “Mitos sobre el subsidio a la gasolina,” 
http://imco.org.mx/articulo_es/mitos-
sobre-el-subsidio-la-gasolina/.
8. CIDAC, http://cidac.org/gasolina-
en-mexico-retos-en-competencia-hacia-
libre-mercado. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Proceso magazine published an 
infographic showing the increases in fuel 
prices in Mexico. See “Los gasolinazos en 
los sexenios de Calderón y Peña,” Proceso, 
See more policy briefs at:
www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs
This publication was written by a 
researcher (or researchers) who 
participated in a Baker Institute project. 
Wherever feasible, this research is 
reviewed by outside experts before it is 
released. However, the views expressed 
herein are those of the individual 
author(s), and do not necessarily 
represent the views of Rice University’s 
Baker Institute for Public Policy.
© 2017 Rice University’s Baker Institute 
for Public Policy 
This material may be quoted or 
reproduced without prior permission, 
provided appropriate credit is given to 
the author and Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy.
Cite as:
Grunstein, Miriam. 2017. The Winter  
of Our Discontent: The Implications  
of Mexico’s Hefty Gasoline Price  
Hikes. Issue brief no. 06.26.17.  
Rice University’s Baker Institute for 
Public Policy, Houston, Texas.
